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The Soft Power of Dissent: The
Impact of Dissenting Opinions
from the Russian Constitutional
Court
Alexandra V. Orlova*
ABSTRACT

This Article poses a question regarding the importance of
judicial dissents emanating from constitutional courts. It
examines the power of dissents emanating from the Russian
Constitutional Court, given the fact that the Russian
government has invested a significant effort in suppressing
dissenting voices. The very presence of dissents in the Russian
Constitutional Court poses an interesting question regarding
their impact on democracy, consensus building, and civil
society. This Article argues that while dissents coming from the
Russian Constitutional Court may not be binding, they carry a
great deal of "soft power." Judicial dissents aid in challenging
commonly espoused consensus both inside and outside the
courtroom and provide a legitimizing voice to marginalized
groups that have frequently been excluded from the dialogue.
Due to the possibility of judicial dissents spilling over from the
confines of the courts, they aid the democratic process, not
necessarily by convincing the majority to change their minds,
but by forming a polity where people's rights are the subject of
an ongoing political debate. The Article concludes that while
judicial dissents are not binding, the true "soft power" of
judicial dissents comes from their ability to challenge the
permanence of both law and consensus. Judicial dissents show
that disagreement matters and is fundamental to democracy.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Do dissenting judicial opinions matter in a state that actively
suppresses dissent within the public sphere and views failure to
conform as an existential threat? The Russian government has
deliberately suppressed dissent on a number of fronts. The state has
repeatedly used the 2014 civil war in Ukraine and Russia's
annexation of Crimea to discredit any sort of opposition to the regime,
with critics painted as unpatriotic and foreign, and as threatening
Russia's very existence.' While the government has invested
significant effort in suppressing dissenting voices, the presence of
dissents in the Russian Constitutional Court (the Court) presents an
interesting question regarding their impact on democracy, consensus
building, and civil society. Due to the nonbinding nature of dissents
emanating from the Court, their possible impact on legal and
2
nonlegal communities is an area lacking in scholarship. This Article
argues that while dissents emanating from the Court may not be
binding, they carry a great deal of "soft power." Judicial dissents aid
in challenging commonly espoused consensus both inside and outside
the courtroom and provide a legitimizing voice to marginalized groups
that have frequently been excluded from dialogue. The possibility of
judicial dissents spilling over from the confines of the courts aids the
democratic process, not necessarily by convincing the majority of the
population to change their minds, but by "forming a polity where
3
people's rights are the subjects of an ongoing political debate."
Judicial dissents provide hope by challenging the permanence of both
4
law and consensus.
Part I of this Article deals with arguments of both Russian and
Western scholars regarding the benefits and detriments of judicial
dissents. It analyzes the January 17, 2012 decision of the Court
dealing with the role of dissent. Part II examines how judicial
dissents can play a transformative role in challenging the common

1.

Cameron Ross, Introduction, in SYSTEMIC AND NON-SYSTEMIC OPPOSITION

IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: CIVIL SOCIETY AWAKENS? 1, 5 (2015).
P.U. Ulturgashev, Osobye Mneniya Sudei v Sravnitelno-PravovomKontekste
2.
[Dissenting Opinions of Judges in a Comparative Legal Context], OTRASLI PRAVA:
http://xn----7sbbaj7auwnffhk.xn-2015),
27,
(May
PORTAL
ANALITICHESKII
plailarticle/6688 [https://perma.cc/5G9J-LQKD] (archived Feb. 17, 2019) (Russ.).
Dan Priel, Are Jurisprudential Debates Conceptual? Some Lessons from
3.
Democratic Theory, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 359, 393 (2012).
See Mari-Claire Belleau & Rebecca Johnson, Ten Theses on Dissent, 67 U.
4.
TORONTO L.J. 156, 165 (2017).
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consensus, thus opening the door for alternative visions and
narratives, making the law more inclusive and more just in serving
its citizens. It examines judicial dissents in two recent casesAnchugov and Gladkov (2016) and Yukos (2017)-where the Court
attempted to redefine its relationship with transnational institutions,
such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and to deal
with issues of sovereignty and constitutional identity. Part III looks
at the impact of judicial dissents on civil society and democracy. The
Article argues that in addition to challenging consensus and
providing a legitimizing voice to disempowered groups, judicial
dissents have the capacity to transcend and exceed the institutions
from which they arise, hence impacting public debate and potentially
public action. It examines the October 2018 debate regarding the
future of the Russian Constitution, Russia's vision of globalization,
universality, and local identity, which was initiated by the chairman
of the Court and transcended the confines of the courtroom. Finally,
the Article concludes that while judicial dissents are not binding, the
true "soft power" of judicial dissents comes from their ability to
challenge the permanence of both law and consensus. 5 Judicial
dissents show that disagreement matters 6 and is fundamental to
democracy.

II. THE MANY SIDES OF DISSENT

Russian legal scholars, not unlike their Western counterparts,
are divided over the value of dissenting opinions.7 On the one hand,
some of the arguments against dissenting opinions relate to them
endangering the unity of the court by impacting collegiality between
the judges, as well as impacting the strength of judicial opinions by
not making the court speak with one voice in the form of a unanimous
opinion. 8 Some authors go so far as to state that dissents may impact
the public's confidence in the majority's opinion.9 A single unanimous

5.
Id.
6.
Id. at 172.
7.
I.M. Deneka, 0 Nekotoryh Osobennostyah Instituta Osobogo Mneniya [On
Some Features of the Institute of Dissenting Opinion], 2 GUMANITARNYE I
URIDICHESKIE ISSLEDOVANIYA 87 (2014) (Russ.).
8.
Olga A. Krapivkina, Judicial Dissents: Legal and Linguistic Aspects, 10 J.
SIBERIAN FED. UNIV. HUMAN. & Soc. Sci. 2449, 2455 (2016); see also D.A. Basangov,
Uridicheskaya Priroda Osobogo Mneniya Sudi Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi
Federatsii [Legal Nature of the Dissenting Opinion of the Judge of the Constitutional
Court of the Russian Federation], 2 ZH. R.P. 24, 25 (2006) (Russ.).
9.
I.S. Frolov, Osoboe Mnenie Sudi Kak Odna iz Garantii Nezavisimosti Sudei
I Ih Ravenstva Pri Postanoclenii Prigovora: Problemy I Perspektivy [The Dissenting
Opinion of the Judge as One of the Guaranteesof Judicial Independence and Equality;
Problems
and
Perspectives,
2
SIBIRSKIE
UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUALNYE
KRIMINALISTICHESKIE CHTENIYA 147, 148 (2017) (Russ.).

I
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judgment and the absence of dissent are "thought to foster the
10
public's perception of the law as dependably stable and secure,"
making it easier to implement the Court's ruling." Random dissents
2
risk weakening "the
(forms of "intellectual exhibitionism")1
the Court appear
making
by
Court"
the
of
institutional impact
3
the Court's
impacting
ultimately
thus
quarrelsome,"'
"indecisive and
4
Court is
the
when
harmful
particularly
be
may
legitimacy.1 Dissents
some
provide
and
issue
social
divisive
a
to
trying to rule in regard
5
are
Dissents
principles.'
and
norms
legal
to
clarity with respect
judges
the
for
only
not
of
work,
amount
thought to create a greater
writing the dissent, but also for the majority, who have to respond to
dissenting arguments.' 6 Despite creating an increased workload, in
most cases dissents-due to their nonbinding nature-do not impact
the rights of the litigants.' 7 Furthermore, the presence of a dissenting
opinion itself or modifications to the opinion of the majority made to
accommodate dissent risk "creating uncertainty or indeterminacy in
the law."' 8
When it comes to contentious social and political issues that
produce a sharp division of opinions, dissenting judgments may make
it appear that the courts' opinions are divided along political rather
than legal lines. This is especially so in constitutional cases, where
9
the rights of the individual are pitted against the state,1 and
20
dissents may be viewed as a platform for airing political views. In
addition to the "institutional costs" of dissents, the "personal costs" of
dissenting for the judge may range from a lack of promotion or
2
reappointment to an outright dismissal. 1 Not surprisingly, dissents
are presented as "individualistic" and as going against the secrecy of
judicial deliberations.22 Moreover, instead of increasing dialogue,

10.
3 (2010).
11.
12.
Praktika

Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1,
Basangov, supra note 8, at 27.
A.S. Ispolinov, Osobye Mneniya v Mezhdunarodnyh Sudah: Doktrina I
[Dissenting Opinions in International Courts: Doctrine and Practice], 1

PRAVO. ZHURNAL VYSSHEI SHKOLY EKONOMIKI 218, 224 (2018) (Russ.).

Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 7.
13.
Ispolinov, supra note 12, at 221.
14.
Deneka, supra note 7, at 90.
15.
Christine M. Joseph, All But One: Solo Dissents on the Modern Supreme
16.
Court of Canada,44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 501, 508 (2006).
Frolov, supra note 9, at 150; see also Freda M. Steel, The Role of Dissents in
17.
Appellate Judging, 67 UNIV. TORONTO L.J. 142, 144 (2017).
Peter W. Hogg & Ravi Amarnath, Why Judges Should Dissent, 67 UNIV.
18.
TORONTO L.J. 126, 135 (2017).
Id. at 134.
19.
Ispolinov, supra note 12, at 231.
20.
Julia Laffranque, Dissenting Opinion and Judicial Independence, 8
21.
JURIDICA INT'L 162, 168 (2003).
Krapivkina, supra note 8, at 2456; see also Laffranque, supra note 21, at
22.
168.
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constant dissenting by some judges can shut down a dialogue, as their
views could be regarded as entrenched by the rest of their
colleagues. 23
On the other hand, those arguing in favor of judicial dissents see
the value of dissent in the maintenance of judicial independence, by
allowing jurists to express disagreements with the majority, 2 4 letting
the "marketplace of ideas" lead to the truth, and making judicial
reasoning more transparent in nature.25 In a sense, dissenting
opinions are reflective of different views of the "requirements of
democratic society" and place a value on pluralism as the cornerstone
of democracy. 26 Furthermore, ability to dissent may reduce pressures
surrounding a contentious arbitration by channeling disagreements
"into more productive forms" when judges are not able to reconcile
their views.27 Dissents force the majority to refine its opinions to deal
with the criticisms outlined in dissenting opinions. In other words,
"[b]y pointing the finger at flaws allegedly affecting the majority's
decision, a well-reasoned dissent encourages the majority to address
the criticized issues thoroughly, thereby raising the level of the
majority's reasoning."2 8 Dissents not only have the capacity to
strengthen and refine the reasoning of the majority, but they also
serve to strengthen the very legitimacy of the judicial deliberative
process 29 by showing the losing party that their arguments were
given thorough consideration, even if ultimately rejected.30 Dissent
has the capacity to increase the transparency of the judicial process
by outlining the various debates that have taken place among the
judges involved in a particular case. 3 1 Dissenting opinions
demonstrate to the public that some areas of the law involve difficult
choices where unanimity is not always possible to achieve. 32
More broadly, dissents challenge "the authoritarian character of
the law" 33 by revealing the multiple reasoning processes behind the
conclusions in any given case and thus challenging the finality of
each one.3 4 Dissents challenge the "rhetoric of inevitability" 35 when it

23.
Ispolinov, supra note 12, at 225.
24.
Hogg & Amarnath, supra note 18, at 130.
25.
Krapivkina, supra note 8, at 2456.
26.
Robin C.A. White & Iris Boussiakou, Separate Opinions in the European
Court of Human Rights, 9 Hum. RTS. L. REV. 37, 59 (2009).
27.
Peter J. Rees & Patrick Rohn, Dissenting Opinions: Can They Fulfil a
Beneficial Role?, 25 ARB. INT'L 329, 330 (2009).
28.
Id. at 335.
29.
I.V. Smolkova, Taina Soveschaniya Sudei I Osoboe Mennie Sudi [The
Secrecy of Judicial Deliberations and Judicial Dissent], 3 VESTNIK OGU 172, 175
(2006) (Russ.).
30.
Rees & Rohn, supra note 27, at 335.
31.
Hogg & Amarnath, supra note 18, at 131.
32.
Steel, supra note 17, at 145.
33.
Krapivkina, supra note 8, at 2456.
34.
Hogg & Amarnath, supra note 18, at 132.
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comes to the majority's conclusions, thus potentially extending the
space for dissent outside the confines of the courtroom and opening
36
the door to future legal challenges. In a way, dissents can shine a
light on issues and arguments that remained invisible in the past,
allowing for the gradual transformation of legal and social
37
consciousness.
Dissents also enable various levels of public debates among
38
Hence,
judges, legal scholars, legislators, and the general public.
influential
be
still
can
they
dissents,
of
nature
nonbinding
despite the
in a number of ways, especially in their capacity to reveal a new trend
39
or an outmoded practice and pave the way for future reform. In
other words, "[t]he dissenting opinion causes restlessness and such
restlessness provides a necessary stimulus for the future, and it helps
40
to avoid routine and critique-free decision-making." Ultimately, in
the words of Charles Hughes, former associate justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court, "a dissent in a Court of last resort is an appeal. . . to
the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly
correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to
have been betrayed." 4 1 Moreover, with the increasing prominence of
comparative law, dissents may play a role in shaping judicial opinions
beyond their own jurisdictions, especially in novel or rapidly changing
42
areas of the law.
Given the lack of agreement regarding the role of dissent when it
comes to judicial reasoning both in Russia and in the West, an
interesting starting point of analysis regarding the role of dissent in
constitutional litigation is the January 17, 2012 decision by the
Court. 4 3 The case revolved around the refusal of the Court to reveal
the content of a dissenting opinion to the accused. The accused
argued that his constitutional right to make full answer and defense
was violated by the refusal of the Court to reveal the content of the
44
dissenting opinion to him. The majority of the Court concluded that
no constitutional violation occurred, but nevertheless stated that the
federal legislator is not precluded from amending the provisions of

&

Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L.
35.
HUMAN. 201, 204 (1990).
Basangov, supra note 8, at 26.
36.
Id. at 27-28.
37.
Krapivkina, supra note 8, at 2456.
38.
Ulturgashev, supra note 2.
39.
Laffranque, supranote 21, at 169.
40.
Hogg & Amarnath, supra note 18, at 138.
41.
Id. at 140.
42.
Opredelenie iz Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiyskoy Federatsii Stat'yami 301
43.
i 312 Ugolovno-protsessual'nogo kodeksa Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 17 yanvarya 2012,
[Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation Concerning Articles
301 and 212 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation of January 17,
2012],

SOBRANIE

ZAKONODATEL'STVA

RoSS11SK01

FEDERATSII

Federation Collection of Legislation] 2012, No. 174-0-0.
Id. T 1.
44.

[SZ

RF]

[Russian
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the Russian Criminal Procedure Code to allow the accused to access
the contents of dissenting opinions in criminal cases. 45 In addition to
finding no constitutional violation, the majority of the Court also
expressed a rather restrained view regarding the role of dissent in the
context of criminal law. 46 The majority of the Court pointed out that
the right to dissent (in both oral and written form) is a form of
procedural guarantee of judicial independence that is outlined in the
Russian Constitution in Article 120(1).4 However, judicial dissent
does not constitute an independent act and does not impact the rights
and responsibilities of litigants, nor does it entail any procedural
consequences for the parties to the case. 48 While this view of the
majority described the role and the impact of dissent in rather
minimalistic terms, the judgment also contained four dissenting
opinions that dealt with the issue of the role of dissent in a more
substantive fashion.
Justice Gadjiev, in his dissenting opinion, stated that dissents do
not violate the secrecy of deliberations, since the content of
deliberations is not revealed in the dissent. 49 A judge engaged in the
writing of a dissent needs to respect the authority of the Court and
the principle of collegiality.50 'The role of dissent extends beyond
simply ensuring the independence of judges; it also plays a role in the
development of the law.5 1 Dissent aids in maintaining the "mental
independence" of judges and increases the overall trust in the system
of justice.5 2 The social utility of dissent is that it increases the
individual responsibility of each judge sitting on a panel. Dissents
show that judicial positions are not simply acts of "self-expression,"
but are based on concrete legal arguments and reasoning.5 3 Justice
Gadjiev summarized the role of dissent as follows:
A dissenting opinion does not weaken, but, on the contrary, strengthens the
authority of the Court. It eliminates a certain hypocrisy by demonstrating what
everyone already knows: two lawyers always three opinions. A good dissenting
opinion is aimed at resolving particularly complex legal problems; it can
suggest how to avoid judicial errors in the future. In this sense, there is an

45.
46.
47.

Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id. ¶ 1. Article 120(1) reads "judges shall be independent and submit only to

the Constitution and the federal law." KONSTITUTsIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST.

RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 120(1) (Russ.).
48.
Opredelenie iz Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiyskoy Federatsii Stat'yami 301
i 312 Ugolovno-protsessual'nogo kodeksa Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 17 yanvarya 2012,
[Decision
of
the
Russian
Federation
Constitutional
Court],
SOBRANIE
ZAKONODATEL'STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of

Legislation] 2012, No. 174-0-0,
49.
Id. ¶ 4.
50.
Id.
51.
Id. ¶ 5.
52.
Id. ¶ 6.
53.
Id.

¶

1.
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undoubted correlation between the right to a dissent, liberalization of judicial
practice, development of law in judicial acts, and the constitutional principle of
democracy.
A dissenting opinion contributes to raising the level of legal consciousness of
society; it guarantees a fair and open trial of the case; contributes to public
debate about the law, as well as to the dialogue between different levels of
courts (which is the main point of judicial democracy); and attracts the
attention of scholars and legislators to pressing legal issues.
The judge's dissenting opinion is not a complaint of a loser, but an argument
of a possible winner in a difficult dispute about the development of the law.
Legal certainty, as an element of the normative content of the principle of a
lawful state, means that it is necessary to eliminate ambiguous, ambivalent
54
norms from the sphere of legal regulation.

In contrast to the very limited view of the majority, Justice Gadjiev
saw the role of dissent as significant for developing public legal
consciousness, thus being a primary building block of democracy.
Justice Zhilin, writing in dissent, agreed with Justice Gadjiev that
55
and can be
dissents do not violate the secrecy of deliberations
56
appeal.
on
influential
Justice Knyazev, in his dissenting opinion, also emphasized that
57
dissents do not violate the secrecy of judicial deliberations and that
the practice of writing dissents is widely supported by many
jurisdictions, as well as being present in many international
tribunals, such as the ECtHR and the International Criminal
Court.5 8 In concluding his dissenting opinion, Justice Knyazev stated
that refusing to disclose a dissenting opinion to the litigant in any
case
[dloes not contribute to identifying and correcting the defects of an unjust
sentence and thus leaves open the question of whether the Russian Federation
can truly be characterized by its own Constitution as a lawful state, where the
highest value is placed on an individual person and his/her freedoms, including
fair application of laws.

59

It is clear that for Justice Knyazev, the role of dissent is connected
with individual rights and the concept of fairness, as well as with the
whole idea of a lawful state. The final dissenting opinion, authored by
Justice Kleandrov, also stated that dissenting opinions do not
undermine the secrecy of judicial deliberations. He furthermore
challenged the majority's conclusions that not allowing the accused in
the criminal case to access the dissenting opinion does not violate the

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. T 7.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 26.
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accused's constitutional rights; he stated that the majority should
have found the current practice of not making the dissenting opinion
available to the accused to be unconstitutional due to vagueness, and
hence taken the chance to direct the federal legislator to clarify this
legal lacuna.60
The judgment of the Court dealing with dissent is revealing in
terms of the various positions taken in regard to the very practice and
importance of dissents by different judges on the Court. There was
certainly no consensus when it came to judicial perceptions of
dissenting opinions, with some judges viewing dissent as having
limited impact and others regarding dissent as fundamental for
democracy, important for future legal developments, and empowering
for civil society. Thus, despite the rather narrow official position of
the Court regarding dissent, the very topic of judicial dissents has
clearly challenged the judicial consensus of the Court.

III. THE ROLE OF DISSENT IN CHALLENGING CONSENSUS

Perhaps one of the greatest values of judicial dissent relates
precisely to its role in challenging consensus. In other words,
unanimity that is merely formal ceases to be a virtue if it is achieved
despite the existence of strong conflicting views. 61 Judicial opinions
are frequently described in terms of their neutrality, abstraction, and
universality. 6 2 The presentation of judicial opinions as neutral
deflects criticism and fails to expose "the fluid relationship between
politics and the law." 63 Thus, "the monologism of judicial rhetoric
results in opinions that are most often decontextualized,
authoritarian, finalized, and dismissive of alternative perspectives. "64
The law, in many ways, can serve as a tool of oppression rather than
liberation, especially when it comes to the marginalized and the
weak. 65 Decisions emanating from the courts, in particular in
constitutional matters, can perpetuate the status quo through
reliance on judicial methodologies of seeking legitimacy in consensus
and relying on precedent. 6 6 Thus, judicial reasoning often serves to
institutionalize the "unquestionable power of the judiciary" and

60.
Id. 1 3.
61.
William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 434
(1986) (transcript of a lecture given at UC Hastings College of the Law).
62.
Katie L. Gibson, In Defense of Women's Rights: A Rhetorical Analysis of
Judicial Dissent, 35 WOMEN'S STUD. COMM. 123, 125 (2012).
63.
Id. at 128.
64.
Id. at 125.
65.
Alexandra V. Orlova, 'Public Interest," Judicial Reasoning and Violence of
the Law: Constructing Boundaries of the "Morally Acceptable," 9 CONTEMP. READINGS

L. & SOC. JUST. 51, 71 (2017).
66.
Id. at 72.
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perpetuate the belief that neutral and objective decisions by the court
67
secure fair outcomes and justice for all.
Judicial opinions are also instrumental in shaping the very
boundaries of debates, thus leaving many groups out of a
conversation due to their inability or unwillingness to accept the very
parameters of debate set by the common consensus and reinforced by
the court. 6 8 Failure to conform to the common consensus-a
consensus further legitimized by judicial reasoning-provides a
69
justification for blaming those experiencing exclusion. However, the
seeming impartiality and neutrality of consensus is often achieved by
subjugating "the interests and values of participants to some other
70
system of interests and values." In other words, the very emphasis
on a common framework can have a marginalizing effect on those
71
representing a truly alternative perspective. Dissent, on the other
hand, has the capacity to "shift the language of the law to legitimate
voices, experiences, and rights of groups traditionally excluded by the
72
rhetoric of the law."
Thus, it is important to not view dissent as a nuisance or a kind
of temporary disruption on the way to progress toward some sort of
universal consensus. 7 3 Even if dissent is not disregarded, it is
frequently regarded as secondary, as the ultimate goal remains the
creation of consensus.7 4 It is difficult to make a shift to viewing
dissention and diversity as "valuable ends of discussion" in and by
themselves, rather than always striving for consensus no matter the
cost.7 5 Judicial dissents can be helpful in challenging and disrupting
the very rhetoric of consensus by making visible multiple truths,
76
especially when it comes to contentious social issues. So, while
judicial dissents may be viewed as a kind of "institutional
disobedience,"" in a way they are "protests within the system" that
78
argue for change by still working within the confines of the system.
Dissents challenge the finality of decisions, while keeping the
conversation open through publicly acknowledging the remaining

Gibson, supra note 62, at 125, 129.
67.
Id. at 131; see also Orlova, supra note 65 at 72.
68.
Kendall R. Phillips, The Spaces of Public Dissension: Reconsidering the
69.
63 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 231, 238 (1996).
Sphere,
Public
Id. at 241.
70.
Id.
71.
Gibson, supra note 62, at 126.
72.
Phillips, supra note 69, at 243.
73.
Id.
74.
Id. at 244.
75.
Marshall Rothstein, The Role of Dissenting and Concurring Reasons in the
76.
Supreme Court of Canada's Charter of Jurisprudence," 27 NAT'L J. CONST. L. 1, 5
(2010).
Erin J. Rand, Fear the Frill: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Uncertain
77.
Futurity of Feminist JudicialDissent, 101 Q.J. SPEECH 72, 73 (2015).
Id. at 79.
78.
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points of contention, thus creating a possible opening for future
change and more meaningful participation by previously excluded
groups.7 9 In fact, "dissent written from a position of institutional
power can provide recognition to a group that feels otherwise unheard
and disenfranchised."8 0

Dissent can play a transformative role in challenging the
common consensus, thus opening the door for alternative visions and
narratives, making the law more inclusive and more just in serving
its citizens. 8 ' It is important to remember that "the rhetorical genre
of the law exists not simply in the texts of judicial opinions but rather
in the psychology of the audience."8 2 Hence, by challenging the law's
consensus built around universality, neutrality, and fairness, judicial
dissents can contribute to transforming the law to better represent
our lived experiences.8 3 However, judicial dissents, despite their
disruptive nature, still constitute "a protest within the system,
[which] argues for change in a way that respects
ven constitutesthat system." 84 Having said that, under certain circumstances judicial
dissents can transcend and exceed the institutions from which they
arise and proliferate in other ways, such as through social protest,.
grassroots movements, and even legislative reforms. In the words of
Justice Marshall Rothstein:
Dissent offers up the law for reinvention and transformation; it provides an
opening for grassroots forms of advocacy that draws on popular culture and

technology to spin the judicial dissent out of its institutional setting and into
wider and more diverse contexts. 8 5

In a lot of ways, dissents are about appealing to future decision
makers and advocates and can serve as "jumping-off points" from
which to advocate for new ideas and directions when opportunity
presents itself.8 It is important that dissent does not simply become

a tool "in the service of . .. consensus," especially where widespread
consensus to maintain the status quo exists among public institutions
as well as the general public.8 7 In such situations, acts of dissent may

be perceived as threats to state sovereignty. 8 8 The cases of Anchugov

79.
Id. at 78.
80.
Id.
81.
Gibson, supra note 62, at 135.
82.
Id. at 136.
83.
Id.
84.
Rand, supranote 77, at 79.
85.
Id. at 81-82.
86.
Rothstein, supra note 76, at 11.
87.
Takeshi Suzuki & Noriko Sekido, Noam Chomsky's Response to President
Bush After 9/11: An Analysis of PublicDissension, in ENGAGING ARGUMENT (2006).
88.
Id. at 39.
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a revealing

illustration of the role of judicial dissent in challenging the status quo
in regard to the role of international institutions and so-called
Western ideas and their impact on Russian sovereignty.

A. Anchugov and Gladkov, No. 12-P (2016)
The Court issued a judgment on April 19, 2016, in the
case concerning the resolution of the question of possibility to execute the
Judgment of the European Court of Human rights of 4 July 2013 in the case of
Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia in accordance with the Constitution of the
Russian Federation in respect to the request of the Ministry of Justice of the
Russian Federation.

91

This trial was the Court's first consideration of the implementation of
92
a decision of the ECtHR in relation to the Russian Constitution. It
involved two applications against the Russian Federation at the
ECtHR, brought forward by Mr. Anchugov and Mr. Gladkov. The
complaint concerned their ban from voting in elections by Article
32(3) of the Russian Constitution, as both were convicted prisoners
serving their sentences in detention. Article 32(3), a part of Chapter
II of the Russian Constitution and thus amendable only by the
93
reads: "citizens detained in a
adoption of a new constitution,

PostanovIenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 19 aprel
89.
2016 g. [Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of April 19,
20161, RossIIsKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] May 5, 2016.
Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii po delu o
90.
Razreshenii Voprosa o Vozmozhnosti Ispolneniya v Sootvetstvii s Konstitutsiyey
Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 31 Iyulya 2014 [Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the
Russian Federation in the Case of the Resolution of the Possibility of Execution in
Accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation of July 31, 2014],
SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL'STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSn [SZ RF] [Russian Federation
Collection of Legislation] 2017, No. 1-P/2017.
Postanovienie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 19 aprel
91.
2016 g. [Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of April 19,
2016], RossIIsKAIA GAZETA [Ros. GAZ.] May 5, 2016.
Peter Roudik, Russian Federation: Constitutional Court Allows Country to
92.
2016),
18,
(May
MONITOR
LEGAL
GLOB.
Rulings,
ECtHR
Ignore
http://www.loc.gov/aw/foreign-news/article/russian-federation-constitutional-courtallows-country-to-ignore-echr-rulings/ [https://perma.cclRG7K-RWS6] (archived Feb.
13, 2019).
KONSTITUTSIIA ROssIsKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art.
93.
135(1)-(3) (Russ.). Article 135(1) provides that any provisions located in Chapter II of
the Russian Constitution "may not be revised by the Federal Assembly." Id. art. 135(1).
In turn, Articles 135(2) and (3) describe a process of convening the Constitutional
Assembly, should a proposal to amend provisions located in Chapter II of the
constitution be put forward and the role of the Constitutional Assembly to either
"confirm the invariability" of the entire constitution or "draft a new [c]onstitution"
which must be adopted by the two thirds of the Constitutional Assembly and submitted
to a public referendum. Id. art. 135(2)-(3).
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detention facility pursuant to a sentence imposed by a court shall not
have the right to vote or to stand for election."94
Anchugov and Gladkov had both been convicted of serious
crimes, including murder, aggravated robbery, and participation in
an organized criminal group. 95 They claimed that being barred from
voting violated their rights under Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or the Convention), concerning
freedom of expression, as well as Article 3 of the Convention's
Protocol No. 1, concerning the right to vote. The latter was argued
both on its own terms and together with the nondiscrimination
provision found in Article 14 of the ECHR. 9 6 Anchugov and Gladkov
both had already tried to bring a case against Article 32(3) of the
Russian Constitution before the Court,97 which rejected the case on
the grounds that it was not within the Court's competence 9 8 and that
the Court had "no jurisdiction to check whether certain constitutional
provisions were compatible with others."9 9 The Russian government's
argument at the ECtHR was that the Russian Constitution held
supreme legal authority within the Russian Federation, and so took
precedence over all other domestic and international law; 10 0 thus, the
ECtHR was not competent to judge Article 32 of the Russian
Constitution's compatibility with the ECHR. 10
The ECtHR responded to the question of the admissibility of the
case by declaring that state parties were required under Article 1 of
the ECHR to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights
and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention," 0 2 and that this
requirement did not distinguish between types of legal instruments
or allow for any part of a state's jurisdiction to be excluded from
review.1 0 3 On these grounds, the ECtHR asserted that international
law held priority over the Russian Constitution, declaring that it is
"with respect to their 'jurisdiction' as a whole which is often
exercised in the first place through the constitution-that the State
Parties are called upon to show compliance with the Convention."1 04
The ECtHR held that under certain circumstances, such as
serious abuse of a public position, individuals' electoral rights could
be restricted, 0 5 but that such restrictions should be made only after

94.
95.

Id. art. 32(3).
Anchugov & Gladkov v. Russia, App. Nos.11157/04 & 15162/05, Eur. Ct.
H.R. ¶¶ 7, 12 (2013).
96.
Id. ¶ 3.
97.
See id. ¶ 23.
98.
Id. ¶ 19.
99.
Id. T 21.
100. Id. T 48.
101. Id.
102. Id. ¶ 50.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. ¶ 97.
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proper consideration and in respect of the requirement of "a
discernible and sufficient link between the sanction and the conduct
106
Drawing on its
and circumstances of the individual concerned."
107
Scoppola v.
and
Kingdom
United
v.
Hirst
in
previous decisions
08
from a
rights
voting
of
removal
the
that
the ECtHR declared
Italy,
grounds
the
on
indiscriminately"
and
group "generally, automatically
of their serving prison sentences, without consideration of the nature
of the offense, the length of the sentence, or the relevant
circumstances, was in violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.109
Failing to find evidence that Russian courts had considered the
proportionality of disenfranchisement in relation to the individual
0
circumstances of each case,1x the ECtHR found that the Russian
government had "overstepped its margin of appreciation" and had
"failed to secure the applicants' right to vote." The Russian
of convicted
Constitution's indiscriminate disenfranchisement
1.111
No.
Protocol
of
3
Article
of
prisoners was thus in violation
46 of
Article
that
explained
ECtHR
the
Summing up its ruling,
the
by
abide
to
ECHR
the
to
the ECHR, requiring states party
to
which
by
means
the
choose
to
ECtHR's judgments, allows states
112
to
available
approaches
possible
With many
ensure compliance.
addressing the voting rights of prisoners, the ECtHR stated:
In the present case, it is open to the respondent Government to explore all
possible ways in that respect and to decide whether their compliance with
Article 3 of Protocol 1 can be achieved through some form of political process or
by interpreting the Russian Constitution by the competent authorities-the
Russian Constitutional Court in the first place-in harmony with the
Convention in such a way as to coordinate their effects and avoid any conflict
between them.

1 13

The Court's 2016 judgment was one of a number of domestic
measures taken in response to the ECtHR's pronouncement. In its
judgment, the Court again emphasized the priority of the Russian
Constitution, declaring that "judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights .

.

. including those containing proposals on the need

to make amendments to the national legal provisions, do not abrogate
the priority of the Constitution of the Russian Federation for Russia's

106. Id.
107. Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 41 (2006).
108. Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 868 (2012).
109. Anchugov & Gladkov v. Russia, App. Nos.11157/04 & 15162/05, Eur. Ct.
H.R. ¶ 100 (2013).
110. Id.
111. Id. ¶ 110.
112. Id. 1 107.
113. Id.
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legal system."11 4 The Court repeated its earlier conclusion in a 2015
constitutional case," 5
which found that interaction between
European Convention law and Russian constitutional law was
impossible under "conditions of subordination."1 6 The only way to
find balance and ensure the effectiveness of ECHR norms within
Russia was through dialogue between the two systems. In short, the
Court once again argued that the ECtHR's decisions must respect
each nation's constitutional identity." 7 The Court saw its own
obligation as finding a "reasonable balance" between the "letter and
spirit" of ECtHR judgments, the fundamental constitutional
principles of the Russian Federation, and the "legal regulation of
human and civil rights and freedoms established by the Constitution
of the Russian Federation."' 1 8 It then declared that the restriction of
certain electoral rights was allowable on the grounds of a need for
stability, as "in order to be stable[,] legal democracy needs effective
legal mechanisms able to guard it, apart from other things, against
abuses and criminalization of public authority."11 9
The majority of the Court's decision was taken up by the
argument that the ECtHR did not understand the Russian situation,
and that the Russian approach to sentencing practices and to Article
32 of the Russian Constitution had long taken individual and specific
differences into account in restricting voting rights.120 A large part of
the judgment was taken up by a description of two earlier ECtHR
cases involving the disenfranchisement of prisoners.' 2 ' In the Court's
opinion, the Russian Federation's approach to the voting rights of
prisoners resembled the approach taken by Italy as evaluated in the
Scoppola case,1 22 rather than the British approach examined in
Hirst.123 Its argument for consistency with the Scoppola approach

114. Postanovienie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 19 aprel
2016 g. [Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of April 19,
2016], RossIIsKAIA GAZETA [Ros. GAz.] May 5, 2016, ¶ 4.2.
115. See Postanovienie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 14 iyul
2015 g. [Ruling of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court of July 14, 2015],
ROssIISKAIA GAZETA [Ros. GAz.] July 27, 2015, ¶ 6 (referencing the discussion in
Anchugov & Gladkov).
116. Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 19 aprel
2016 g. [Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of April 19,
2016], ROSSKAIA GAZETA [Ros. GAz.] May 5, 2016, T 1.2.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. T 2.
120. Id. ¶ 5.1.
121. See id. ¶¶ 1.1, 3.
122. See id. ¶ 3 (commenting that the approach to prisoner voting rights in the
Scoppola case was upheld by the ECtHR due to it being differentiated and
individualized); see also Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3) App. No.126/05, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R.
868 (2012).
123. Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 19 aprel
2016 g. [Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of April 19,
2016], ROSsiisKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] May 5, 2016, ¶ 3; see Hirst v. United Kingdom
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was based on a review of a century of Russian legal history on the
issue, including the Russian Constitution of 1993, where Article 32 is
found. 12 4 While the 1993 constitution was being drafted, the Court
argued, there had been an opportunity to "turn down an absolute ban
to participate in elections, established for citizens kept in places of
deprivation of liberty under a court sentence," and a deliberate
125
In the Court's
decision had been made not to pursue this option.
words, "It is necessary to admit that the constitutional legislator in
this case expressed his will quite clearly and definitely, having
extended the restriction established by him to all convicted persons
12 6
belonging to this category."
According to the Court, evidence of consideration of individual
and specific differences in the restriction of prisoners' voting rights
could be found in the process of drafting the 1993 Russian
Constitution. A reference to being "detained in a detention facility"
following a court sentence was substituted for an earlier wording
describing citizens subject to "restriction of liberty." This amounted to
a narrowing in scope of the provision, to include only life or fixedterm imprisonment; 127 as a result, no person can be deprived of
8
voting rights without first receiving a court sentence.12 The wording
in Article 56(1) of the Russian Criminal Code "citizens who are kept
in places of deprivation of liberty under a court sentence"-means
that persons in detention prior to sentencing are not restricted by
Article 32 of the constitution. 129 Article 56(1) of the Russian Criminal
Code also ensures that a first-time offender convicted of a minor
crime can only be given a sentence involving the deprivation of liberty
in exceptional circumstances, as outlined in Section 63 of the Russian
Criminal Code, and only after the nature and circumstances of the
30
offense have been comprehensively reviewed.o The Court concluded
that the provisions of criminal law in Russia "practically fully
exclude[d] the possibility of application of deprivation of liberty to
persons having committed crimes of small gravity for the first time in
(No. 2), App. No.74025/01, 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 41 (2006) (discussing that the ECtHR found
that the case was problematic due to the presence of an automatic deprivation of voting
rights for all prisoners without any differentiation).
124. See Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 19 aprel
2016 g. [Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of April 19,
2016], ROSSiISKAIA GAZETA [ROs. GAz.] May 5, 2016, ¶¶ 4-4.2.
125. Id. ¶ 4.1.
126. Id.
127. Ivan Kleimenov, Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation no 12-P/2016: Refusal to Execute Judgments of ECHR or the Search for
Compromise between Russian and InternationalLaw?, 1 QUESTIONS INT'L L. 19, 29
(2016).
128. Id. at 30.
129. Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 19 aprel
2016 g. [Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of April 19,
2016], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] May 5, 2016, T 5.1.
130. Id. T 5.2.
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the absence of aggravating circumstances." 1 3 ' As well, the Court used
statistics to show that very few people convicted of crimes of lesser
gravity had received sentences involving imprisonment, which would
lead to the removal of their voting rights. 132 The Court's conclusion,
based on statistics and on legal principles in criminal law, found that
the Russian judicial and legal systems provided adequate
individualization and differentiation in the limitation of prisoners'
voting rights. 3 3
According to the Court, Russia was already following the
Scoppola approach in its handling of prisoners' voting rights.1 34 Its
objections to the ECtHR's argumentation in Anchugov and Gladkov
drew on a "multiannual experience of a constructive cooperation and
mutually respective dialogue" between the Court and the ECtHR; the
Court's objection to the ECtHR's ruling was thus intended as "a
contribution to the crystallization of the developing practice of the
European Court of Human Rights in the field of suffrage protection,
whose decisions are called upon to reflect the consensus having
formed among States Parties to the Convention." 3 5 Despite its
disagreement with the ECtHR's description of how Russia handled
prisoners' voting rights, the Court saw further room for cooperation
with the Convention system and the ECtHR, perhaps including
further reform of sentencing under criminal law to "optimize the
system of criminal penalties," or a decrease in incarceration via the
use of "alternate kinds of penalties." 36 Such changes, however, were
the responsibility of the legislator.' 3 7 Lastly, the Court found that the
ECtHR's judgment in Achugov and Gladkov was merely the "in
abstractoreview of a norm,"1 3 8 an "act of abstract normative control"
by the Strasbourg court.' 3 9 The ECtHR, therefore, was involved in
"norm construction" and policy making, rather than keeping to its
role of examining the specific issues involved in the case it was
considering.140

131. Id.
132. Id. T 5.3.
133. Id.
134. Id. ¶ 5.2.
135. Id. T 4.4.
136. Id. T 5.5.
137. Id.
138. Id. ¶ 6.
139. Kleimenov, supra note 127, at 37.
140. Postanovienie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 19 aprel
2016 g. [Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of April 19,
2016], RossIsIKAIA GAZETA [Ros. GAZ.] May 5, 2016, ¶ 6; see also D.I. Dedov, Judge of
the Eur. Ct. of Hum. Rts., Konstitutsionnyi Sud Rossii: Zhit Nastoyashim, Pomnya
Proshloe I Ustremivshis' v Budushee [The Constitutional Court of Russia: To Live in
the Present, Remembering the Past and Rushing to the Future] 6 (May 17-18, 2016)
(Russ.); S.D. Knyazev, Obyazatelnost Postanovlenii ECPCH v Pravovoi Sisteme Rossii
(na Osnove Praktiki Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii), Zhurnal
Rossiiskogo Prava (2016) X, at 12 (Russ.).
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The judgment of the majority is certainly reflective of the current
Russian governmental consensus in terms of viewing "Western
influences" and those who support them as associated with
41
and posing a threat to
"undermin[ing] the country from within"1
14 2
Thus, in a way, the majority opinion of the
Russian sovereignty.
Court becomes a further guarantor of that sovereignty by interpreting
human rights claims through the sovereignty lens and framing its
43
reasoning as an act of resistance to Western judicial activism.1
However, the truths of this consensus were challenged by two
dissents from Justices Yaroslavtsev and Kazantsev.
Justice Yaroslavtsev disagreed with the majority of the Court
regarding inability to comply with the measures of general character
(i.e., differentiation and individualization when it comes to prisoner
44
While the Russian
voting rights) suggested by the ECtHR.1
Constitution does contain a total ban on prisoner voting rights in
Article 32(3), the constitution does not stand in "proud isolation"
within Russian law; rather, it has to be viewed in tandem with other
branches of Russian law.1 45 The ECtHR rightly pointed out that
Article 1 of the ECHR does not exempt any sort of norms and
measures from being reviewed against the provisions of the
Convention. In other words, no part of the "jurisdiction" of member
states is immune from being reviewed against the provisions of the
ECHR.1 4 6 Hence, member states need to demonstrate compliance
with the provisions of the ECHR when it comes to their entire
14 7
While the Russian
"jurisdiction," including their constitutions.
Constitution contains a ban on prisoner voting rights, the
constitution does not prescribe the implementation of this restrictive
measure. Therefore, it is crucial to consider criminal law, criminal

141. Pavel Romanov & Elena larskaia-Smirnova, "'ForeignAgents'in the Field of
Social Policy Research: The Demise of Civil Liberties and Academic Freedom in
ContemporaryRussia,"25 J. EUR. SOC. POLY 359, 362 (2015).
142. A.B. Lazarev, Vzaimosvyaz' Natsionalnogo I Mezhdunarodnogo Prava na
Primere ECPCH i Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF. Rol' ESPCH I KS RF v
Konstitutsionnom Prave Rossii [Interrelationof the National and InternationalLaw in
the Example of the ECtHR and the ConstitutionalCourt of the Russian Federation:The
Role of the ECtHR and the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in the
ConstitutionalLaw of Russia], 10 INTERAKTIVNAYANAUKA 10, 210 (2016) (Russ.).
143. A.A. Klishas, Chairman, Federation Council Committee on Constitutional
"Sovremennaya
konferentsii
na
Doklad
Building,
State
and
Legislation
Konstitutsionnaya Ustitsiya: Vyzovy I Perspektivy" [Report at the Conference:
"Modern Constitutional Justice: Challenges and Prospects"] 8 (May 17-18, 2016)
(Russ.).
144. See Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 19 aprel
2016 g. [Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of April 19,
2016], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [Ros. GAZ.] May 5, 2016, pmbl. at 57-58 (Yaroslavtsev, J.,
dissenting).
145. Id. 1 2, at 59.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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procedure law, and other relevant branches of law in order to
understand the basis, conditions, and consequences of this
prohibition.1 48 Thus, while the Russian Constitution fixes the
categories of citizens that are deprived of voting rights, the federal
legislature determines the actual composition of these categories. In
other words, it is the federal legislature that concretizes the
constitutional prohibitions in regard to voting.1 4 9 Thus, the federal
legislature has the ability to achieve partial differentiation of
prisoner voting rights by developing and concretizing the meanings of
terms such as "deprivation of liberty," "places of deprivation of
liberty," "detention," and "in accordance with the judgment of the
court." In conclusion, Justice Yaroslavtsev stated:
As follows from the above, an adequate constitutional-legal interpretation of
Article 32 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation in conjunction with the
provisions of criminal law, including Articles 15, 56, and 57 of the Criminal
Code of the Russian Federation, permits avoiding conflicts related to
restrictions on electoral law, thus making it possible to comply with measures
of a general character [related to differentiation and individualization of
prisoner voting rights] as indicated by the European Court of Human Rights
...
in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, and to
achieve compatibility of these [ECtHR] measures with the provisions of the
Constitution. 1 5 0

It is clear that Justice Yaroslavtsev's dissent suggested that the
constitutional provisions containing a total ban on prisoner voting
rights can be interpreted in a way to achieve individualization and
differentiation as required by the ECtHR if the constitution is
considered together with other branches of Russian law. In other
words, individualization and differentiation can be achieved through
constitutional interpretation and federal legislative amendments to
various provisions of criminal and criminal procedure laws. Instead of
interpreting the Russian constitutional ban on prisoner voting rights
in a rigid fashion and viewing it through the lens of state sovereignty,
Justice Yaroslavtsev indicated that, in fact, compliance with the
ECtHR judgment could be achieved through constitutional
interpretation. Even more importantly, Justice Yaroslavtsev
challenged the dominant view of state sovereignty espoused by the
majority and instead called for greater engagement with (rather than
disengagement from) Western institutions such as the ECtHR, by
stating that Russian constitutional provisions are not "immune" from
being reviewed for their compliance with the provisions of the ECHR.
This dissent certainly poses a challenge to the current Russian

148.
149.
150.

Id. ¶ 3, at 60.
Id. ¶ 3, at 62.
Id. T 4, at 63.
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consensus centered on protecting domestic sovereignty, including
15 1
legal sovereignty, from "Western meddling."
While Justice Yaroslavtsev's dissent primarily focused on issues
of constitutional interpretation, the dissenting opinion of Justice
Kazantsev went even further in challenging Russia's current standoff
with the West. Justice Kazantsev pointed out that the right to elect
152
Thus, federal legislators can restrict
and be elected is not absolute.
3
Hence, if the federal legislator can
circumstances.15
it under certain
that the legislator can expand
follows
also
it
rights,
restrict voting
the right to vote contained in
on
prohibition
the
Thus,
voting rights.
absolute prohibition and can
an
not
is
constitution
the
of
Article 32(3)
54
rights contained in Article
voting
prisoner
on
ban
be modified.1 The
rather than the
maximum,
the
constitutes
32(3) of the constitution
the federal
that
rights
voting
prisoner
on
minimum, restriction
not require
does
32(3)
Article
However,
set.
to
legislature is entitled
constitutional
This
rights.
voting
prisoner
all
on
an automatic ban
provision, read alongside other constitutional provisions, allows the
federal legislature to give voting rights to some of the individuals
55
If the need to limit the scope of the ban
contained in this category.
on prisoner voting rights flows from Russia's international legal
obligations, the federal legislature is not only able to, but must use its
right to lower the total ban on prisoner voting rights contained in
Article 32(3), in order to comply with the norms of the ECHR as they
were interpreted by the ECtHR in the Anchugov and Gladkov v.
56
Russia case.'
In accordance with Article 15(4) of the constitution of the
Russian Federation, the ECHR constitutes part of Russia's legal
system; thus, Russia (as a member state) must comply with the
57
decisions of the ECtHR interpreting norms contained in the ECHR.
Given the fact that the Constitution of the Russian Federation and
the ECHR are based on the same normative values, in the case of
conflict the Russian Federation can only preference the provisions of
the Russian Constitution (including the way these provisions are
interpreted by the Court) over the provisions of the ECHR (including
the way these provions are interpreted by the ECtHR) if the Russian
constitutional provisions contain a more comprehensive protection of

151. Alexandra V. Orlova, Privatizing Homosexuality: Russia's Reassertion of
"Moral Sovereignty" over Gay Rights, 11 HUM. RTs. & INT'L LEGAL DIScOURSE 122, 139
(2017).
152. See Postanovienie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 19 aprel
2016 g. [Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of April 19,
2016], RossIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAz.] May 5, 2016, 1 2, at 49 (Kazantsev, J.,
dissenting).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. T 2, at 52.
157. Id. T 3, at 52.
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human rights, including when it comes to balance with other
constitutional rights.1 5 8 Thus, if the Russian Constitution (including
the way it is interpreted by the Court) contains a less comprehensive
protection of rights in comparison with the ECHR norms (including
the way these norms are interpreted by the ECtHR), it follows that
the Russian Federation must preference the provisions of the ECHR
and follow the decisions of the ECtHR.15 9
In this particular case, there is little doubt that the ECHR, as it
has been interpreted by the ECtHR, provides a more comprehensive
protection of prisoner voting rights.1 6 0 By ratifying the ECHR, the
Russian Federation has made it part of its legal system and thus, by
virtue of Article 46 of the ECHR, must recognize the mandatory
jurisdiction of the ECtHR as the body tasked with interpreting the
provisions of the ECHR.161 Moreover, the Russian Federation must
comply with the decisions of the ECtHR as it interprets the norms of
the ECHR, even when, in the opinion of the Russian Federation, the
interpretation of the ECHR by the ECtHR differs from the original
intent of the Russian Federation at the time of signing and
ratification of the ECHR.1 62 It is notable that a current trend away
from a total ban on prisoner voting rights is observable in various
international instruments.1 63 Thus, it is possible and necessary for
the Russian Federation to implement the decision of the ECtHR in
the Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia case, due to the ability of the
federal legislature to regulate the categories of prisoners and thus
avoid a total ban on prisoner voting rights. 16 4 The individualization
and differentiation of prisoner voting rights does not require
amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation. It can be
achieved either through amendment of relevant election legislation or
by amending criminal and criminal procedure law to optimize the
system of penalties requiring imprisonment. 16 5
It is clear that Justice Kazantsev, by virtue of his dissent, has
challenged the restrictive view of sovereignty as isolationist and
immutable and demonstrated by virtue of his judgment that a greater
connection between domestic and international forms of judicial
control is certainly possible.1 6 6 Justice Kazantsev's view of
sovereignty, then, does not necessarily create tension between the

158. Id. T 3, at 53.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. T 3, at 54.
162. Id.
163. Id. T 3, at 55.
164. Id. ¶ 3, at 56.
165. Id.
166. See Alexandra V. Orlova, Sovereignty, Dissent, and the Shaping of
International Consensus around Human Rights: An Examination of Russian
'Disengagement"from the European Court of Human Rights, 35 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 435, 466-67 (2018) [hereinafter Orlova Disengagement].
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67
development of human rights and sovereignty.1 He prioritizes the
concerns of individuals over sovereignty concerns by stating that, in
cases of conflict, the system that provides a more comprehensive
protection of rights should be given preference, hence allowing rights
168
to be reclaimed by their individual holders.

B. Yukos, No.1-P (2017)
Another notable dissent that pushed the boundaries of existing
and governmentally reinforced consensus regarding the role of
Russia's constitutional identity vis-a-vis international law and the
judicial institutions interpreting its norms is in the 2017 case of
Yukos. This 2017 judgment of the Court stemmed from a September
169
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Court that
contained in Article 113 of the Tax Code, on the investigation of tax
offenses, was not applicable in cases of dishonest taxpayers.171 The
ECtHR stated that the Court's interpretation regarding the
retroactive applicability of Article 113 to dishonest taxpayers was not
reasonably foreseeable and created an unpredictable exception to the
172
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rule where previously there were none.
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to
government
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Not surprisingly, the ECtHR's decision on the merits as well as
the award of compensation created a vocal outcry in Russian political

167. See Carly Nyst, Solidarity in a DisaggregatedWorld: UniversalJurisdiction
and the Evolution of Sovereignty, 8 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 36, 59 (2012).
168. Orlova Disengagement, supra note 166.
169. OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, App. No. 14902/04 Eur. Ct.
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171. Id. ¶ 572.
172. Id. ¶ 573.
173. Id. ¶ 575.
174. OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, App. No. 14902/04 Eur. Ct.
H.R. T 36 (2014).
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circles against the authority of the ECtHR.17 5 As a result, the
Russian Ministry of Justice raised the question regarding the
possibility of implementation of the ECtHR decision before the Court
in 2017. The majority opinion of the Court for the most part replicates
the Court's judicial reasoning in the Anchugov and Gladkov case.
The Court reiterated the earlier conclusions that it had reached
in a 2015 constitutional reference case' 76 as well as in the 2016
Anchugov and Gladkov judgment regarding the impossibility of
interaction between the European conventional and the Russian
constitutional legal orders "in the conditions of subordination."1 7 7 The
Court stated that only dialogue between different legal systems can
ensure a proper balance between them.178 The Court stated that the
effectiveness of the ECHR's norms within the Russian constitutional
order is dependent upon respect by the ECtHR of national
constitutional identity. 7 9 However, despite these strong statements,
the Court also noted that in its practice it is bound to follow the
decisions of the ECtHR even if they are based on the application of
"evolutive reasoning," "substance over form," and so on, which can
lead the ECtHR to depart from its earlier positions.18 0 The Court also
noted that it is ready to search for a lawful compromise for the sake of
supporting the fundamental significance of the European system of
protection of human rights and freedoms.' 8
Despite its statement about searching for a compromise, the
Court went on to state that, in cases where the substance of a
decision of an international body for the protection of human rights
and freedoms impinges unlawfully upon the basic principles and rules
of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, "Russia may deviate,
by way of exception, from performing the obligations placed upon it
by such decision, provided that this deviation is the only possible way
to avoid the violation of the Constitution of the Russian
Federation."1 82 Interestingly, the majority of the Court seems to have
engaged with the argument made in Justice Kazantsev's dissenting
opinion in the Anchugov and Gladkov case regarding comprehensive
protection of rights and balancing of rights. The majority stated that
the Court cannot support the interpretation of the ECHR provided by
the ECtHR if Russian constitutional norms (including the way these
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norms are interpreted by the Court) contain a more comprehensive
protection of human rights and freedoms, taking into account the
balancing of rights. 183 Hence, the majority of the Court engaged in
relativizing the issue of what constitutes a more comprehensive
protection of human rights and freedoms by assessing the rights of
Yukos shareholders against other Russian taxpayers.
The rest of the majority's decision dealt with the interpretation
of Article 113 of the Russian Tax Code, which contained a statutory
limitation period to hold an individual accountable for tax offenses.
The majority held that what needed to be remembered and was of
principal importance in this case was the fact that material losses
sustained by Yukos as a result of the actions of Russian tax
authorities were the consequences of illegal activities by the company
itself.18 4 Yukos was a persistent tax defaulter, and when it ceased to
exist it left unpaid outstanding tax obligations. The Court held that
[t]he payment as a result of the ECtHR decision to former [Yukos] shareholders
who engaged in illegal scheming to avoid taxation, as well as to their heirs and
legal successors, of such significant sums of monetary compensation from
public funds which were systematically deprived by the company of due
amounts of tax payments necessary for meeting public obligations to all the
citizens and overcoming the financial and economic crisis, contradicts the
principles of equality and fairness in tax relations.

185

Thus, the Court held that the decision of the ECtHR pertaining to
186
payment of compensation could not be enforced.
The decision of the majority regarding the impossibility of
implementation of the ECtHR decision in the Yukos case was a
predictable outcome, given the majority's reasoning in the Anchugov
and Gladkov case. What is notable, however, despite the predictable
conclusion, is a more cautious statement by the Court regarding its
relationship with the ECtHR, framing cases of nonimplementation as
exceptional, as well as engaging with dissenting reasoning in the
Anchugov and Gladkov case. This case, similar to the Anchugov and
Gladkov case, contains a dissent written by Justice Yaroslavtsev.
Justice Yaroslavtsev stated that the Court should not have admitted
the request of the Ministry of Justice. The Russian authorities should
have appealed the 2011 judgment by the ECtHR to the Grand
Chamber within a three-month period, as provided for by Article 43 of
the ECHR. Having failed to exercise their right to appeal, the
Russian Federation acknowledged, at least formally, the legal validity
of the ECtHR's conclusions pertaining to the violations of the
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ECHR.' 8 7 The inconsistent and contradictory position of the Russian
authorities created a "legal dead end."1 8 8 The current attempt by the

Ministry of Justice to find a "simplified solution" to the situation by
filing a case before the Court was flawed in that this case could not be
admitted due to a principle that "no one can be a judge in his own
case."' 8 9 The conclusions of the ECtHR regarding violations of the
ECHR were in large part based on the finding that the Court violated
the principle of legality in its 2005 judgment that stated that the
statutory limitation period did not apply in the case of dishonest
taxpayers.19 0 Justice Yaroslavtsev stated that
the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation should not seek easy ways of
resolving the problem by means of applying to the Constitutional Court.
Instead, it is necessary to continue a dialogue with the Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe, using the process outlines in Article 46 of the
ECHR.19'

This continued dialogue, rooted in the process contained in Article 46
of the ECHR, would increase the interaction of the ECtHR and
domestic organs of state power, will aid in the implementation of the
ECHR, and will not harm Russia's national sovereignty. 9 2
When it came to the majority's reasoning specifically dealing
with tax matters, Justice Yaroslavtsev stated that only the legislatdi
could establish and change statutory limitation periods.' 9 3 Hence, the
Court exceeded its own jurisdiction by assuming the role of legislator
in setting aside the statutory limitation period.1 94 The federal
legislature did exercise its proper role by amending the provisions of
Article 113 of the Tax Code to interrupt the statutory limitation
period under certain circumstances in January 1, 2007.195 Therefore,
the provisions of Article 113 of the Tax Code in their amended version
could only be applied from January 1, 2007 onward. Thus, until
January 1, 2007, the Tax Code imposed a three-year limitation term
that was mandatory and unconditional. Hence, the Court went
beyond its powers in permitting retroactive application of tax law in
regard to Yukos.1 9 6
Comparing the judgment of the majority with Justice
Yaroslavtsev's dissent, it becomes apparent that Justice Yaroslavtsev
is speaking out against legal isolationism and calling for re-
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engagement, regardless of how difficult the dialogue it may entail. He
points out that this type of interaction between national and
transnational bodies will not undermine Russia's sovereignty. Hence,
Justice Yaroslavtsev's dissent represents continuity in terms of the
arguments he espoused in his earlier dissent in Anchugov and
Gladkov. His dissent also aligns well with another dissenter-Justice
97
that is
Kazantsev-in challenging the existing political consensus
reinforced by the majority judgments in both the Anchugov and
Gladkov and Yukos cases. The very existence of dissents in such
politically charged cases as Anchugov and Gladkov and Yukos is a
positive development for Russian legal culture, due to the historical
legacy of law and courts "serving the needs of the regime, not the
people."1 9 8 The law and the courts were both used in pre-Soviet and
post-Soviet Russia in order to suppress all opposition. Hence,
"[i]nstead of being courts of justice, they became forums for
propaganda and a means by which enemies of the state could be
19 9
'legally' disposed or severely punished."
The presence of dissenting opinions in the rulings of the Court
serves to increase the legitimacy of the judiciary and may eventually
help in reshaping the public opinion that views the judicial branch as
200
While law serves the
a simple extension of the executive one.
function of establishing the framework where, supposedly, "the truth"
will be determined, 201 courts (especially constitutional courts) are
tasked with the "creation of a regularized and legalized form of
truth." 20 2 Thus, having multiple truths emerge by way of judicial
dissents has the potential to not only challenge the commonly
espoused "consensus," but also to provide a legitimizing voice for the
marginalized, such as prisoners or the shareholders of a company
that fell into governmental disfavor.

197. See generally N.S. Raikova, Problemy Obespecheniya Nezavisimosti Sudei
Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii[Problems of Ensuring the Independence
of the Judges of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation], 341 VESTNIK
TOMSKOGO GOSUDARSTVENNOGO UNIVERSITETA 130 (Russ.).

198. Shawn S. Cullinane, Can the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
Lead the Way to the Creationof a True Democratic Society in the New Russia in the 21st
Century?, 17 TOURO L. REV. 397, 400-01 (2001).
199. Id. at 401.
200. M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory
of Dissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 340-41 (2007) ("Paradoxically by undermining the
authority of the Court, dissent increases the power of the Court and the law by
insulating it from potential political attacks.").
201. Id. at 288.
202. Id. at 289.
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IV. DISSENT, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND DEMOCRACY

In addition to challenging consensus and providing a legitimizing
voice to disempowered groups, judicial dissents have the capacity to
transcend and exceed the institutions from which they arise, hence
impacting public debate and, potentially, public action. In other
words, judicial dissents certainly have the capacity to spill over into
the public sphere, 20 3 as was recently illustrated by a highly politically
charged speech made by the chairman of the Court, Valeri Zorkin, in
the media, and the ensuing response to his speech. On October 9,
2018, the Rossiiskaya Gazeta newspaper, the official governmental
mouthpiece and the most widely circulated newspaper in Russia,
published an article by Zorkin regarding his vision for future
constitutional reform. 204 Zorkin acknowledged that the Russian
Constitution is not a static document, but rather contains in its text
"transformational potential" that allows it to be forward looking and
to ensure the preservation of social compromise in changing social
realities, thus guaranteeing sociopolitical stability. 205
After Zorkin acknowledged the "living tree" aspect of the Russian
Constitution, he provided lengthy statements regarding Russia's
unique constitutional identity, public consensus, and minority rights.
Zorkin stated that the changes generated by globalization are not
always beneficial and at times carry enormous risks and costs in
various spheres of human life-from economic to social life, from
politics to culture-in all regions of the world. 20 6 Thus, a desire to
oppose processes of sociocultural globalization arises within various
jurisdictions. There emerges a greater resistance to universalization:
At the level of mass consciousness, this is manifested in the desire to formulate
their religious, national, or regional (for example, European) identity, to
preserve and strengthen the traditional values of the family, culture, life, etc.
And at the level of public authorities, this is manifested in the desire to prevent
the erosion of national state sovereignty and to solidify national constitutional
identity. 2 0 7

When it comes to constitutional law, Zorkin stated that the
dissatisfaction of citizens within national jurisdictions stems from the
expansion of influence of supranational bodies such as the ECtHR,
the "democratic deficit[s] of which are becoming increasingly

203. Basangov, supra note 8, at 30.
204. Valerii Zorkin, Bukva I duh Konstitutsii, ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA [Ros. GAZ.],
(Oct. 9, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://rg.ru/2018/10/09/zorkin-nedostatki-v-konstituciimozhno-ustranit-tochechnymi-izmeneniiami.html
[https://perma.cc/6MAG-Q9J4]
(Russ.)
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obvious." 208 Thus, the increasing influence and judicial activism
exhibited by supranational bodies necessitates the creation of "certain
'counter-limits' that would constrain the actions of supranational
institutions. 209 Zorkin stated that the idea of Russian constitutional
identity was first utilized in the Anchugov and Gladkov case dealing
with prisoner voting rights. He then pointed out that
the ECtHR's unwillingness to take into account the fact that national
constitutional review bodies do not have the degree of freedom to interpret the
Constitution, which the ECtHR judges allow themselves in their interpretation
of the abstract provisions of the European Convention, looks particularly
unclear. The so-called evolutive interpretation of the Convention by the
[ECtHR], in fact, is aimed at creating a new unified European law and order.
And national constitutional justice cannot go beyond the limits of
interpretation established both by the Constitution itself and the conventions
that have been established within the society, which are the basis of the
constitutional identity of the people.

210

Zorkin went on to state that the principle of national constitutional
identity is reflective of the fact that (1) social consensus pertaining to
the issues of human rights in various states has sociocultural
specificity, and (2) this public consensus pertaining to human rights
is established by the majority of society and is established for the
majority. Zorkin stated that he does not mean to say that the concept
of constitutional identity is focused only on the protection of the
rights of the majority. However, he did emphasize that the rights of
minorities can be protected only to the extent that the majority
agrees. It is impossible to impose on society a legislative norm that
denies or calls into question the basic values of the common good
2 11
shared by the majority of the country's population.
Zorkin's argument makes clear the powerful nature of "public
consensus" and the way that this consensus has been intimately
connected to the idea of local constitutional identity as a mechanism
of resistance to Western influences and interpretations of minority
rights. Zorkin's newspaper article did not go unchallenged. For
example, another more pro-Western newspaper, Novaya Gazeta,
published a response to Zorkin's article by Elena Lukyanova,
professor at the Russian Higher School of Economics. Lukyanova
questioned Zorkin regarding his vision of majoritarian consensus. She
asked, "What type of majority are you talking about? Is this the
majority formed by dishonest television propaganda? Is it the
parliamentary majority that became the majority due to not quite fair
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and not quite free elections?" 2 12 Lukyanova also criticized Zorkin's
view regarding Russia's constitutional identity. She stated that "it
looks like [Zorkin] wants [the Russian Constitutional] Court to
become a supplier of ultimate truth, in case of disagreements with the
European Court of Human Rights."2 1 3 Ultimately, different versions
of the "truths" represented in the Anchugov and Gladkov and Yukos
cases have been placed into the public realm, demonstrating the
potentially powerful nature of judicial ideas.
The very public nature of debate regarding Russian
constitutional identity, sovereignty, and the relationship with
Western institutions such as the ECtHR raised very similar issues to
those raised by the majority and dissenting opinions in the Anchugov
and Gladkov case as well as the Yukos case. Hence, the issues that
were debated within the confines of the courtroom have now firmly
entered the public sphere-a debate that has become much more
relevant given Russia's potential exit from the Council of Europe and
the ECtHR. 214 Some of the key points expressed in judicial dissents in
Achugov and Gladkov as well as in Yukos have been restated outside
of the courtroom as possible alternatives for Russia's future,
especially given Russia's current path toward disengagement from
the West. 215 Hence, despite the limited view expressed by the
majority of the Court regarding judicial dissents not constituting
independent acts and having no impact on the rights and
responsibilities of litigants, it is hard to disagree with the dissenting
opinion of Justice Gadjiev, who emphasized the potential "soft
power"2 16 of dissent as having the ability to impact legal
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consciousness. 2 17 Hence, judicial dissents remind us that court
rulings can have profound impacts "on real people living normal
2 18
lives-and that these impacts and lives matter[."
Judicial dissents represent a right to confrontation, which is
219
In a way, judicial dissents
crucial in a democratic society.
220
Judicial dissents, while not
democratize judicial decision making.
leveling the playing field, can certainly provide a voice to the
22
disempowered through the legitimacy of judicial argument, 1 as well
as provide greater engagement for all sides by forcing dialogue (at
222
Ultimately,
least within the confines of the courtroom, as a start).
one of the key problems in trying to achieve and maintain consensus
at all costs is that
if people concentrate on the consensus, problems emerge. As a result of
bracketing others' ideas, people ignore diverse alternative arguments, however
rational, severely limiting practical criticisms. They have to judge within a very
2 23
limited range of communication.

To argue against the value of judicial dissent is to hope for the
constitutional law to remain fixed or frozen, rather than to be
responsive to social changes. 224 The indirect impact of dissent can be
quite significant. 225 Dissents frequently act as placeholders, in order
to create space for social or legislative actions to advance democracy
2 26
when the conditions permit.
Power, FIN. PoST (Aug. 20, 2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/20/the-rise-and-fallof-soft-power [https://perma.cc/27N9-TE56] (archived Apr. 4, 2019).
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A carefully thought-out and appropriate dissent can "salvage for
tomorrow the principle that was sacrificed or forgotten today ...
[and] keep the democratic ideal alive in days of regression,
uncertainty, and despair." 227 Dissent serves to invite those excluded
by the majority opinion and by broader social consensus back into the
dialogue, as well as to extend the dialogue outside of the
courtroom. 2 28 In the absence of dissent, "the constant evolution and
revolution that is democracy dies." 229

V. CONCLUSION

While arguments regarding positive and negative aspects of
judicial dissents remain among Russian and Western scholars, it is
hard to discount the "soft power" of dissent to challenge the
prevailing consensus. Hence, dissents can be a powerful tool when it
comes to debate and democracy, precisely due to their capacity to
show the availability of "multiple truths" and keep the conversation
open. In a way, dissents force the majority to deal with dissenting
arguments and can transcend the confines of the courtroom. Hence,
while not all decisions to dissent are driven by ideological criteria,2 3 0
the ones that truly challenge the unanimity of consensus can be
profoundly impactful.
One of the most important strategic considerations that should
drive the writing of dissents should be "to look beyond the immediate
differences of opinion, and craft dissents in such a way that we can
eventually shape the law as collective wisdom says it should be, not
as we selfishly want it to be." 23 1 Thus, if judges become reluctant in
writing dissents, then such dissent aversion can impose significant
costs on law and society. 232 While dissent in the legislature, for the
most part, is not readily accessible to the general public, the visibility
of judicial dissent, while certainly taking courage to write, can also
serve to foreshadow and contribute to social transformation.2 3 3
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Judicial dissent legitimizes challenges to consensus by displaying the
diversity of societal views, including those views that go against
23 4
While in the short run,
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